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Abstract: This paper presents a fuzzy set based decision support model for taking
uncertainty into account when making security investment decisions for distributed
systems. The proposed model is complementary to probabilistic approaches and use-
ful in situations where probabilistic information is either unavailable or not appropriate
to reliably predict future conditions. We first present the specification of a formal se-
curity language that allows to specify under which conditions a distributed system is
protected against security violations. We show that each term of the security language
can be transformed into an equivalent propositional logic term. Then we use proposi-
tional logic terms to define a fuzzy set based decision model. This optimization model
incorporates uncertainty with regard to the impact of investments on the achieved se-
curity levels of components of the distributed system. The model also accounts for
budget and security constraints, in order to be applicable in practice.
1 Introduction
Emerging digital environments and infrastructures have rapidly generated new ways and
services of communication, information sharing, and resource utilization for individuals,
organizations, and societies in past years. For example, it has become common for indi-
viduals to use security services, such as I2P Anonymous Network and TOR. Organizations
have started to explore the opportunities of web services, including storage services (e.g.,
Amazon Simple Storage Service) and computing services (e.g., Microsoft’s Azure Services
Platform and Google App Engine). While the aforementioned services are realized with
cloud computing, services can also be requested from multiple administrative domains
(grid computing). Even whole societies are involved in scenarios with shared information
and transaction processing, as political elections with electronic voting systems show.
What all these services have in common is that some kind of distributed information
processing and/or information sharing occurs, across private, organizational, or national
boundaries. Often, consumers of these services have no control over their data, and they
need to trust service providers not to violate their security policies. For example, scientific
computation results can be modified or provided to third parties. In some cases, organi-
zational, legal, and/or technical countermeasures have been taken in order to prevent or to
mitigate the consequences of data abuse. For example, in Internet voting the separation
of duties is quite common in order to realize the separation of voter’s identity and his/her
vote. In such cases, the abuse of data by a single party (insider abuse) and the compro-
mise of systems by attackers (outsider abuse) do not disclose confidential information.
However, what happens when multiple parties maliciously cooperate and join their infor-
mation, or when multiple system components are compromised jointly by attackers? This
leads to scenarios where a voter’s ID can be assigned to his/her vote, where the identity of
a user is disclosed through the cooperation of parties of an anonymity mix net, etc. Conse-
quently, when security investments in distributed systems are planned, the questions arise
of (1) how important the security of particular system components is, and (2) how much
should be invested in which component to increase the overall security of the distributed
system. Thereby, we focus on the ex ante security assessment of distributed systems, and
the support of security investment decision makers.
Beyond the challenge to address the aforementioned interdependencies between system
components, decision makers also face budget constraints and various sources of uncer-
tainty. Unfortunately, uncertainty is often not probabilistic so that the application of proba-
bilistic approaches is of limited effectiveness. We thus draw on fuzzy set theory, which is a
valuable uncertainty theory in the absence of probabilities and in the presence of subjective
assessments.
The main purpose of this paper is to present a novel fuzzy set based decision support
model for security investment decision makers. From the methodological perspective,
we formally derive the decision model by proposing a formal security language and by
applying propositional logic, decision theory, and fuzzy set theory. We further draw on
computational complexity theory to analyze the complexity of the model.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents related work. In
Section 3, we describe our research framework. Section 4 proposes the formal security
language, demonstrates its applicability, and shows how resilience terms of the security
language can be mapped on propositional logic terms. Section 5 provides a brief intro-
duction into uncertainty modeling and fuzzy set theory. In Section 6, the fuzzy decision
support model is proposed and analyzed. Section 7 discusses implications and shows op-
portunities for further research.
2 Related work
The economics of information security investments has been analyzed in the literature
at both the ex post level and the ex ante level (decision making). An example of the
former perspective is the NIST Performance Measurement Guide for Information Security
[NIS08], which focuses on ex post security measures. As the focus of this paper lies
on decision making, we concentrate our overview on papers on the ex ante analysis of
information security investments.
In their survey of economic approaches for security metrics, [BN08] analyze the litera-
ture through a methodological lens and identify two main areas of research, where one
has its roots in investment and decision theory and is mainly pursued in the field of in-
formation technology-oriented business administration, and the other area of research has
ancestors in micro-economics and deals with market concepts to gather security-relevant
information. We adopt a different perspective and focus on theoretical approaches used to
address uncertainty in security investment decision making. Unsurprisingly, the literature
is very much focused on probabilistic approaches and often adopts the risk-based perspec-
tive. [GL02] present an economic model that determines the optimal amount to invest to
protect a given set of information and that uses probabilities that attacks are successful.
[GJC09] propose metrics for measuring the price of uncertainty due to the departure from
the payoff-optimal security outcomes under complete information, and assume that agents
face randomly drawn probabilities of being subject to direct attacks. [GCC08] apply game
theory to study how economic agents invest into security in different economic environ-
ments, and they assume that attacks arrive with a probability that remains constant over
time. [CRY08] consider the decision-making problem of a firm when attack probabili-
ties are externally given. In their approach to derive implications for security investment
strategies based on attackers’ decisions, [CN06] draw on the probability of (attackers’)
success given an amount of effort put into attacking a given target. [HHB06] propose an
economic model that considers simultaneous attacks from multiple external agents with
distinct characteristics, and derive optimal investments based on the principle of benefit
maximization. In their model they draw on security breach probabilities.
However, there are also dissenting voices, which doubt the appropriateness of using proba-
bilistic approaches. For example, [WCR05] argue that risk-driven decision models are lim-
ited due to the difficulty of reliably estimating the potential losses from security breaches
and the probability of these breaches. [HN10] find that risk assessment methods found in
the literature tend to underestimate the risks associated with large-impact, hard-to-predict,
and rare events.
We found two papers that suggest to apply fuzzy sets in the context of security investment
decisions. [Lee03] presents a simple model that uses linguistic variables to represent crite-
ria upon which investment decisions are made. [KSST09] suggest to use fuzzy sets in the
context of evaluation processes. In their paper, fuzzy sets are used to express the extent
with which security measures are implemented in an organization.
3 Research framework
Our approach (see Figure 1) assumes that the structure of a distributed system is known.
We draw on this structure to derive a formal resilience term, which specifies which com-
ponents and/or groups of components need to be secure with regard to a particular security
requirement r (e.g. confidentiality, anonymity) so that the overall distributed system is
secure with regard to r. The specification of r is important, because different security
requirements can lead to different resilience terms. For example, in a system that imple-
ments a mixnet that routes messages sequentially through a setN of n anonymizing nodes,
each node must be secure with regard to availability (n out of N ), while only one node
needs to be secure with regard to achieving anonymity (1 out of N ). The formal security
language that we propose in this paper draws on [HKS00], who use secret shares [BK05]
and the concept that k out of n entities are required for revealing a secrecy. We adopt and
adapt this concept, and we say: “k out of N entities must be secure”. In contrast to the
aforementioned papers, which regard entities/components as homogeneous, we account
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Figure 1: Research framework
for heterogeneity of entities by explicitly itemizing them in the set N .
While resilience terms are a useful representation of required security properties of a dis-
tributed system, they are less appropriate for analyzing systems with regard to weak points
and strong points, and for making security investment decisions. We show that each re-
silience term can be mapped on a propositional logic term such that both terms are se-
mantically equivalent, and we show that converting propositional logic terms into normal
forms, such as the conjunctive normal form (CNF), is a useful way to identify such weak
and strong points.
Accounting for the fact that security investment decision makers need to consider various
sources of uncertainty and different types of constraints, we suggest a fuzzy decision sup-
port model. The goal function of this model is derived from the CNF representation of the
particular resilience term, which links the introductory, theoretical parts of this paper with
the proposed decision model. We finally analyze the structure of the decision model, and
we discuss types of required data.
4 Formal security language and propositional logic terms
4.1 Formal security language
As our formal security language describes required security properties of distributed sys-
tems, we first define distributed systems: A distributed system is either an “atomic system”
or is composed of other (sub)systems. We define a system as “atomic” if it contains only
(atomic) components that are not being split any further. These components can be per-
sons, computers, or even organizational units.
The definition of the security language (resilience terms) in terms of syntax and semantics
follows the inductive definition of systems and is provided by definitions 4.1-4.4. In order
to keep definitions short, we introduce the abbreviation “wrts. r” (with regard to security
requirement r).
Let S be an atomic system with the set of atomic components A = {Ai}ni=1.
Definition 4.1 A system S is (k out of N)-resilient, k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}, N ⊆ A, wrts. r
:⇔ At least k components out of N need to be secure wrts. r in order to make S meet r.
In order to get more flexible representations of requirements on atomic systems, we define
the following resilience terms:
Definition 4.2 A system S is a) ((k1 ? . . .? km) out of (N1, . . . , Nm))-resilient,
b) ((k1 > . . .> km) out of (N1, . . . , Nm))-resilient, ki ∈ {1, . . . , |Ni|}, Ni ⊆ A ∀i,
wrts. r
:⇔
{
For a) each, b) any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, at least ki components out of Ni need to
be secure wrts. r so that S meets requirement r.
With regard to non-atomic systems, we define resilience terms similarly: Let {Si}ni=1 be
(sub)systems of a system S, and let system Si be li-resilient for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 4.3 A system S is (k out of {li1 , . . . , lim})-resilient, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
{i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, wrts. r
:⇔
{
At least k systems out of {Si1 , . . . , Sim} need to be secure wrts. r so that S meets
requirement r.
Definition 4.4 A system S is a) ((k1 ? . . .? km) out of (N1, . . . , Nm))-resilient,
b) ((k1 > . . .> km) out of (N1, . . . , Nm))-resilient, ki ∈ {1, . . . , |Ni|},
Ni ⊆ {l1, . . . , ln} ∀i, wrts. r
:⇔
For a) each, b) any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, at least ki systems out of the set of systemsfor which Ni contains resilience terms need to be secure wrts. r so that S meetsrequirement r.
We now illustrate the security analysis and the determination of resilience terms with an
example.
Example 4.1 We use a web service scenario, in which a retailer uses three web services
in order to identify customers’ behavior. Service A offers data mining capabilities and
stores sales data, including customer IDs. Service B is offered by a financial service
provider, who provides credit ratings of customers. Service C provides storage capacities
and stores master data on customers, including their customer IDs and identities. In this
example, we consider secrecy with regard to information on which customer has bought
what under which financial conditions. Secrecy is kept if one of the providers A and B
is secure, or if one of B and C is secure. With regard to provider A, we assume that
this provider accounts for secrecy by storing data on two components (A3 and A4) and
implementing a secret share mechanism [BK05]. Components A1 and A2 are responsible
for distributed computation in terms of data mining; both components get data from A3
and A4. With regard to financial service provider B, customer IDs generated by B (they
differ from customer IDs stored at A) are stored on B1 and B2 together with financial
data by implementing a secret share mechanism. Components B3 and B4 store names
of customers and customer IDs (generated by B) redundantly. Analogous to A and B,
storage provider C implements a secret share mechanism when storing customer data.
Figure 2 shows the overall system S. Applying definitions 4.1, 4.2a, 4.2b, and 4.4b, we
yield the following resilience terms:
• A is ((2? 1) out of ({A1, A2}, {A3, A4}))︸ ︷︷ ︸
l1
-resilient wrts. r. (def. 4.2a)
• B is ((1> 2) out of ({B1, B2}, {B3, B4}))︸ ︷︷ ︸
l2
-resilient wrts. r. (def. 4.2b)
• C is (1 out of {C1, C2})︸ ︷︷ ︸
l3
-resilient wrts. r. (def. 4.1)
• S is ((1> 1) out of ({l1, l2}, {l2, l3}))-resilient wrts. r. (def. 4.4b)
4.2 Propositional logic terms
As example 4.1 shows, resilience terms can become complex, even for small systems. In
order to yield representations that are comfortable to interpret for persons and appropriate
for the computation of the uncertainty with which a system does not fulfill a specific re-
quirement r, we transform resilience terms into propositional logic formulas. Particularly
useful is the subsequent transformation of formulas into semantically equivalent formulas
in normal form, such as the disjunctive normal form (DNF) or the conjunctive normal form
(CNF). These normal forms show different strengths: while the CNF allows to determine
“weak points”, such as single points of failure, the DNF is useful for identifying “strong
points”, such as components or subsystems where security results in the security of the
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Figure 2: System structure and resilience values of Example 4.1
overall system, regardless of the security (levels) of other components and subsystems.
Thus, both normal forms should be applied complementarily.
Theorem 4.1 Let system S consist of basic components A = {A1, . . . , An}, and let
{XA1 , . . . , XAn} be literals with XAi =true ∀i, iff Ai is secure. Then, the resilience
term l of S can be mapped on a propositional logic formula f(l) such that S is secure iff
f(l) is true.
Due to limitations of space, we provide a sketch of proof only: The principal idea of the
proof is that we reformulate the expression “k out of a set L” by explicitly considering
all combinations of elements of L, where L can be a set of basic components or of re-
silience terms of subsystems. The provision of such a mapping f (of resilience terms on
propositional logic terms) proves the theorem.
We use the example shown in Figure 2 to illustrate how to determine the propositional
logic formula of a particular resilience term.
Example 4.2
• resilience term l1 = ((2? 1) out of ({A1, A2}, {A3, A4}))
⇒ f(l1) = (f((2 out of {A1, A2}))) ∧ (f((1 out of {A3, A4})))
= ((A1 ∧A2)) ∧ ((A3) ∨ (A4)) = A1 ∧A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4) =: fA
• resilience term l2 = ((1> 2) out of ({B1, B2}, {B3, B4}))
⇒ f(l2) = (f((1 out of {B1, B2}))) ∨ (f((2 out of {B3, B4})))
= ((B1 ∨B2)) ∨ ((B3) ∧B4)) = B1 ∨B2 ∨ (B3 ∧B4) =: fB
• resilience term l3 = (1 out of {C1, C2})
⇒ f(l3) = (C1) ∨ (C2) = C1 ∨ C2 =: fC
• resilience term l = ((1> 1) out of ({l1, l2}, {l2, l3}))
⇒ f(l) = (f((1 out of {l1, l2}))) ∨ (f((2 out of {l2, l3})))
= (((f(l1))) ∨ ((f(l2)))) ∨ (((f(l2))) ∨ ((f(l3))))
= (f(l1)) ∨ (f(l2)) ∨ (f(l3)) = (fA) ∨ (fB) ∨ (fC)
= (A1 ∧A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4)) ∨ (B1 ∨B2 ∨ (B3 ∧B4)) ∨ (C1 ∨ C2)
(1)
We now convert the resulting propositional logic term into DNF and CNF. The DNF rep-
resentation can be easily derived from (1) and is given by
(A1 ∧A2 ∧A3) ∨ (A1 ∧A2 ∧A4) ∨B1 ∨B2 ∨ (B3 ∧B4) ∨ C1 ∨ C2 (2)
Having available the DNF representation, we can easily derive the CNF representation,
which is given by∧
X ∈ {A1, A2, A3}
Y ∈ {A1, A2, A4}
Z ∈ {B3, B4}
(X ∨ Y ∨B1 ∨B2 ∨ Z ∨ C1 ∨ C2) (3)
While the DNF representation in 2 shows that each of the components B1, B2, C1, C2 is
a strong point, the CNF representation reveals that there is (fortunately) no single point of
failure.
5 Fuzzy set theory
Fuzzy set theory goes back to Lotfi Zadeh [Zad65], who proposed fuzzy sets as means for
dealing with non-probabilistic uncertainty. As it is far beyond the scope of this paper to
provide an overview of this field, we briefly introduce the very basic ideas of fuzzy set
theory [Zim96, BE02]. The key idea of fuzzy set theory is the extension of the (crisp)
membership concept in traditional set theory by providing for a degree with which an
element belongs to a set. The degree is specified by a membership function.
Definition 5.1 Let Ω be some set. Then we define a fuzzy set A as follows:
A := {(x,A(x))|x ∈ Ω}, with A(x) := µA(x) : Ω → [0, 1] being the
membership function.
(4)
Figure 3: Linguistic variable security [Zim96, p. 132]
A particular type of fuzzy set is a fuzzy number:
Definition 5.2 A fuzzy number is a fuzzy set A over Ω = R such that µA(x) is piecewise
continuous and it exists exactly one interval [a, b] with µA(x) = 1 ∀a ≤ x ≤ b.
For example, a fuzzy set can represent an integer number close to 10, where
A = {(x, µA(x))|µA(x) = (1 + (x− 10)2)−1, x ∈ R}
Set-theoretic operations with fuzzy sets are pointwise defined over their membership func-
tions [Zim96, BE02]. For example, the membership function µC(x) of the intersection
C = A ∩ B can be defined by µC(x) = min{µA(x), µB(x)}, x ∈ Ω. Further set-
theoretic operators, and relational operators and arithmetic operators for fuzzy numbers
are presented in [Zim96, BE02].
Another powerful concept in the field of fuzzy set theory turned out to be linguistic vari-
ables [Zad73]. We present a formal definition provided by [Zim96, p. 131]:
Definition 5.3 A linguistic variable is a quintuple (x, T (x),Ω, G,M), where (1) x is the
name of the variable (e.g., security), (2) T (x) = T denotes the terms of the variable (e.g.,
{very insecure, moderately insecure, moderately secure, very secure}), (3) Ω is some set,
(4) G is a syntactic rule for generating terms, and (5) M(T ) assigns a fuzzy set to term T .
Example 5.1 Figure 3 shows an example of the linguistic variable security.
6 Fuzzy decision support model
6.1 The model
In order to keep the model simple, we do not consider more than one security require-
ment at the same time, thus receiving a model that contains only one goal function. If
we need to address several security requirements contemporaneously, which differ with
regard to their resilience terms, we get a multi-criteria decision model, which contains one
goal function for each security requirement. We assume that the security description of a
distributed system, which contains the set of components A, is given by the propositional
logic formula (in CNF)
A = (A11 ∨ . . . ∨A1n1) ∧ . . . ∧ (Am1 ∨ . . . ∨Amnm)
=
m∧
i=1
 ni∨
j=1
Aij
 , Aij ∈ A ∀i, j, Aij not necessarily different (5)
In accordance with our assumption that security levels and security investment expenses
can be appropriately represented by terms of linguistic variables and by fuzzy numbers,
respectively, we suggest the following fuzzy decision model, which includes a fuzzy ob-
jective function, fuzzy variables, fuzzy parameters, and crisp constraints:
max ((X11 ∪ . . . ∪X1n1) ∩ . . . ∩ (Xm1 ∪ . . . ∪Xmnm)) =
m⋂
i=1
 ni⋃
j=1
Xij
 (6)
s. t. Xij ≥ B0ij ∀i, j|Aij ∈ A (7)
Xij ≥ B∗ij ∀i, j|Aij ∈ A (8)∑
i,j|Aij∈A
cij(Xij , B
0
ij) ≤ b (9)∑
i,j|Aij∈A(t)⊂A
cij(Xij , B
0
ij) ≤ bt ∀t (10)
cij(Xij , B
0
ij) ≤ bij ∀i, j|Aij ∈ A (11)
Xij , B
0
ij , B
∗
ij ∈M(T (security)) ∀i, j|Aij ∈ A (12)
b, bij , cij(Xij , B
0
ij) ∈ R (fuzzy numbers), ∀i, j|Aij ∈ A (13)
The fuzzy decision model aims at maximizing the overall security of the system described
by A under security constraints (regarding single system components) (7-8) and budget
constraints (9-11). The decision variables Xij are fuzzy variables and can be assigned
fuzzy sets of terms of the linguistic variable security (12) – M maps linguistic terms on
fuzzy sets. For example, T (security) could consist of the terms very insecure, moderately
insecure, moderately secure, very secure. The fuzzy goal function (6) combines all deci-
sion variables (security expressions) according to the logic-based security description A.
In (6), the fuzzy set operators ∪ and ∩ are union and intersection operators, respectively,
and they correspond to the logical operators ∨ and ∧. Here we can see how the binary
differentiation between secure and insecure components is fuzzified. It should be noted
that, in contrast to crisp decision models, it still needs to be specified how fuzzy sets are
ordered in order to maximize the objective value.
The optimization underlies two types of security constraints: for each component Aij , the
security level Xij after the investment cij(Xij , B0ij) must be larger than or equal to its
original level B0ij (7) and must also be larger than an exogenously given aspiration level
B∗ij (8), where B
0
ij , B
∗
ij are fuzzy sets of linguistic terms (12). The optimization also
underlies three types of budget constraints: the overall expenses to increase the security
levels from B0ij to Xij must be not larger than an overall fuzzy budget constraint b (9).
Similarly, there may be a budget constraint for a single component (11) or for a group of
components (10). It should be noted that the expenses for increasing the security level of
a component depend on the current security level and the future security level (11). We
model expenses as fuzzy numbers.
It should also be noted that while all constraints contain fuzzy sets, the decision of whether
a constraint is met is sharp (in our model). This is due to the fact that (in our model)≤ and
≥ define dichotomous relations between two fuzzy sets. Alternatively, we could define
fuzzy relations. In this case, we would have to specify how constraints are combined. In
this paper, we do not follow this path. We now present a simple example instance of our
fuzzy decision model.
Example 6.1 Let us assume that a distributed anonymizing system connects a source node
S and a destination node D through two different paths (due to availability concerns),
each of which contains two nodes (see Figure 4a). We use the linguistic variable security,
which contains the terms T (security)={very insecure, moderately insecure, moderately
secure, very secure}. The security conditions of the nodes are shown in Figure 4a. Figure
4b shows graphically the membership functions of the fuzzy sets of the terms. Figure 4c
provides the expenses for increasing the security level. For the purpose of simplicity, the
fuzzy numbers given in the table refer to all components. We also require component A11
to become at least moderately insecure. The overall budget of all security investments
is approximately 70,000 USD, and the security investment in component X12 should not
exceed 25,000 USD.
The resilience term of the system is ((1? 1) out of ({A11, A12}, {A21, A22})), which re-
sults to the propositional logic formula (in CNF): ((A11 ∨ A12) ∧ (A21 ∨ A22)). We get
the following fuzzy decision model (the numbers in the model refer to the numbers of the
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Figure 4: Data of example 6.1
generic fuzzy decision model presented above):
max ((X11 ∪X12) ∩ (X21 ∪X22)) (6)
s. t. X11 ≥M(very insecure) (7)
X12 ≥M(moderately insecure) (7)
X21 ≥M(very secure) (7)
X22 ≥M(moderately secure) (7)
X11 ≥M(moderately insecure) (8)
c11(X11,M(very insecure)) + c12(X12,M(moderately insecure))+
c21(X21,M(very secure)) + c22(X22,M(moderately secure)) ≤ 70 (9)
c12(X12,M(moderately insecure)) ≤ 25 (11)
Xij ∈M(T (security)) ∀i, j|Aij ∈ A (12)
6.2 Solving model instances
We now discuss which data and which specifications are necessary to solve an instance of
the model.
1. The model requires knowledge of the security structure A. This structure can be
derived by determining the resilience term and its representation as propositional
logic formula in CNF.
2. In order to maximize the goal function, possible results need to be ordered, i.e. the
decision maker needs to specify how fuzzy sets are ordered. There is not one single
solution of this problem; for example, we can draw on the relation of fuzzy sets as
used in constraints (7) and (8). Alternatively, we can first defuzzify both fuzzy sets
and then compare the resulting crisp values.
3. As the model uses a preference relation of two fuzzy sets ((7)-(11)), the decision
maker needs to specify a concrete preference relations s/he applies (see Subsection
5).
4. The decision maker needs to know budget constraints. While the overall budget
is often known (at least approximately), approximate budgets for components and
groups of components are not always given. In case budget constraints of the latter
type are not desirable, the respective constraints can be removed from the model.
5. The linguistic variable security needs to be defined, including the definition of the
terms T(security) (e.g., very insecure) and their membership functions. Figure 4b
provides such a linguistic variable.
6. For each component, the expenses to increase the level of security need to be spec-
ified in terms of a fuzzy number. For example, the decision maker may find that it
cost about 50,000 $ to make a very insecure component moderately secure. Figure
4c shows an example of expenses for increasing the security of a component.
Each instance is a discrete optimization problem, where
• the number of decision variables nV is the number of components (nV ≤
∑m
i=1 ni)
1,
• the solution space contains nS = |T (security)|nV elements, i.e. the size of the
solution space increases polynomially in the number of linguistic terms, but it in-
creases exponentially in the number of components,
• the number of constraints nC is nV (7) + nV (8) + 1(9) + nV (11) = 3 · nV + 1.
However, we can easily reduce the number of constraints to 2 · nV + 1, when we
merge constraints (7) and (8) and substitute these with Xij ≥ max {B0ij , B∗ij}.
As the size of the solution space increases exponentially in the number of components
–four security levels and ten components lead to a solution space that consists of nS =
410 ≈ 106 elements –, solving a problem instance through enumeration becomes com-
putationally infeasible. Even worse, the decision model turns out to be NP-hard so that
the application of heuristic procedures becomes necessary for large instances. Again, due
to space limitation we cannot provide details of the formal proof of NP-hardness in this
paper. The guiding idea of the proof is the demonstration how the satisfiability problem
1-3-SAT, which is NP-complete [KL99, p. 59], is reducible to the fuzzy decision problem
in polynomial time.
1Aij do not need to be pairwise different.
7 Discussion
We now discuss some limitations and drawbacks of our approach and show how they can
be addressed in further research.
While a key advantage of using a fuzzy decision support model lies in the dispensability
of historic, probabilistic data, which are often unavailable, the solution of an instance of
our (generic) fuzzy model requires to specify membership functions of fuzzy sets, terms of
linguistic variables, and fuzzy operators in such a way that the model mirrors the attitudes
and assumptions of the decision maker with regard to security investments. More precisely,
what needs to be specified is the order of fuzzy sets with regard to the objective function
and with regard to the constraints, the terms and membership functions of the linguistic
variable security, upper budget bounds and lower security bounds, the current security
level of components, budget constraints, and the function c, which maps a pair of (current)
security level and (future) security level on an amount of investment. Empirical work
would need to identify these attitudes and assumptions of decision makers. In addition, one
could also draw on security standards, such as the Common Criteria [ISO09], to specify
under which conditions a component is how secure and to determine terms of the linguistic
variable security.
A further assumption of our decision model is that the structure of the distributed system
is known. This is not always the case; for example, in several anonymizing networks the
participating components are determined during process execution.
Due to the NP-hardness of the decision model, solving large instances optimally becomes
computationally infeasible. Consequently, further research needs to develop heuristic al-
gorithms.
If the decision maker needs or wants to distinguish between different security require-
ments, s/he would have to use one (fuzzy) goal function per requirements. The resulting
model is a fuzzy multi-criteria problem, which can be solved with methods proposed in
the literature (e.g., [Zim96, p. 303ff]).
Despite the aforementioned challenges with regard to the application of the fuzzy deci-
sion support model, we argue that a fuzzy set based perspective on security investment
situations is a valuable means for practitioners, who need to deal with uncertainty in the
absence of (reliable) probabilities.
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